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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-1692 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHAMAR LANELL BANKS, 
 
       Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-11-cr-00002-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2012 
 
 
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2013) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
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Shamar Lanell Banks pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base and hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  He was 
sentenced to 198 months’ imprisonment, and now appeals his sentence.  We affirm.  
In July of 2010, York, Pennsylvania police coordinated a controlled drug purchase 
between Banks and an unidentified cooperating source.  The purchase was to take place 
near McKinley Elementary School on the corner of Manor and Kurtz Streets in York.  
Banks arrived by car at approximately 7:00 p.m. and pulled up next to the source, who 
was seated in his own car on the designated corner.  Banks chose to move the meeting 
location south on Manor Street in the direction of Springettsbury Avenue and York 
College. 
While Banks was traveling to this new location, Detective Scott Nadzom and 
Officer Hower believed Banks observed them in their unmarked vehicle.  Detective 
Nadzom advised assisting traffic units to stop and arrest Banks.   
When Banks made a left-hand turn onto Springettsbury Avenue, multiple marked 
and unmarked traffic units began their pursuit.  Among those units was Sergeant John 
Veater, who had both his lights and siren activated.  Banks did not stop his car, proceeded 
to drive at a rate of 40 to 50 miles-per-hour in a 25 mile-per-hour residential zone, and 
failed to stop for five posted stop signs.  The chase continued through at least eight 
residential blocks, including those with limited visibility among row houses and bumper-
to-bumper parking lining both sides of the street.  Banks then abandoned his car and fled 
on foot.  Indeed, he evaded arrest until October of 2010.   
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In July of 2011, Banks pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base and hydrochloride.  The District Court held a sentencing hearing 
at which Banks contested the applicability of a two-level enhancement under United 
States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment while fleeing from the 
police.  Detective Nadzom and Sergeant Veater testified at that hearing in support of the 
§ 3C1.2 enhancement.  The District Court determined that the enhancement was 
warranted.  Banks appealed, and raises one issue: whether his sentence is procedurally 
unreasonable because the District Court erred in applying the two-level enhancement 
under § 3C1.2.    
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Banks asserts that the District Court committed a procedural error by applying a 
two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 
because his actions would otherwise be considered minor traffic violations.  Section 
3C1.2 applies when “the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or 
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement 
officer.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.  A district court must find all facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  With 
respect to the application of § 3C1.2, a district court must find that the defendant acted 
recklessly and that the action created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.  
Recklessness is defined “as a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk 
created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that 
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risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would exercise in such a situation.”  U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.2 cmt. n.2, 2A1.4 cmt. n.1.     
Banks drove his car at twice the legal speed limit on a residential street and 
disregarded posted stop signs.  That neighborhood was in close proximity to an 
elementary school, college, public park, and commercial district where pedestrian traffic 
is common.  The close quarters of the row houses that line the streets, and the bumper-to-
bumper parking on both sides of the road, limit sightlines and reduce awareness of 
pedestrian presence.  Although Banks did not strike or nearly strike bystanders or 
vehicles, direct instances of harm are not relevant to a determination of a “substantial risk 
of death or serious bodily injury.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (emphasis added).   
Speeding, running stop signs, and leading police in a pursuit through a residential 
area created the risk and recklessness that the District Court found in applying  § 3C1.2.  
This is sufficient to warrant an enhancement.  United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 
(3d Cir. 1992).  In this context, the District Court’s imposition of a two-level 
enhancement under § 3C1.2 is hardly in error.  We thus affirm Banks’s sentence. 
 
